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Introduction
Whilst some theorists consider that it is only within courts that justice can be found1 and
find the extension of the concept of justice beyond court-based adjudication to be troubling,
the reality is that justice has always existed outside judicial determination and outside
courts. This is partly because for most people who are in a dispute, justice involves little
contact with a court or a judge. Most civil disputes settle without a hearing and it is rare
that court based adjudication is necessary. Arguably, court based adjudication is less likely
to be used to determine civil disputes than in the past and this is partly because Alternative
Dispute Resolution, in its various iterations, is increasingly being used to resolve, settle,
and manage civil disputes.2
Justice, or the 21st century framing of the concept of justice, extends beyond notions that
focus on the rule of law and legal rights. A broader view of justice has been explored by
policy makers and theorists3 who have noted that:
Just as health is not found primarily in hospitals or knowledge in
schools, so justice is not primarily to be found in official justicedispensing institutions. Ultimately, access to justice is not just a matter
of bringing cases to a font of official justice, but of enhancing the justice
quality of the relations and transactions in which people are engaged.4
This conception of justice provides that justice is found outside courts and can be supported
by a range of systems, schemes, processes, and people that may have little, if anything, to
do with courts or the court system. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes that
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2012) with kind permission and Tania Sourdin, A broader view of justice in MICHAEL LEGG, THE FUTURE OF
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support pre- action (or prefiling) requirements and alternative institutional and systemic
arrangements mean that a court is not the first port of call for most civil disputes - if it ever
was. Although research is limited, most people in a civil dispute appear to be able to
negotiate and reach an outcome that may be guided by the rule of law and the realities of
the justice framework and in most jurisdictions do so without ever commencing
proceedings in a court.
As justice operates outside courts, then what is the role of the court within the justice
system and has it changed over the past two decades? It seems clear that courts in the
expansive and renovated justice system that exists in the 21st century are not at the
epicenter of the justice system. Whilst courts, judges, and the role that is played by legal
institutions in supporting the rule of law are critical in both creating justice and securing it,
the role of an independent court system and impartial adjudication is essential in the
weaving of the social fabric of a civilized society and creating social justice where liberty
and equality remain critical values. Arguably, courts play an increasingly less relevant role
in directly providing everyday justice for most citizens. It is likely that this trend will
continue into the future for a range of reasons beyond simply the problems of cost and
delay that are present in many courts.
The changing role of the courts is partly attributable to the developments that have occurred
in many jurisdictions as a result of the increased use of ADR in civil disputes over the last
fifty years. This rise of ADR and the awkward relationship this “alternative” has with the
court system has been a focus of discussion for many years. Initially, it was thought that
ADR could be integrated into the court system through the creation of a multi-door court
model which focused on “in court” referral and attracted a great deal of interest in the
United States following discussion, experimentation, and commentary in the 1970s and
1980s. For example, Professor Frank Sander suggested that disputes could be referred to
appropriate forums (or “doors”) for resolution or determination after entry into the court
system:
One might envision by the year 2000 not simply a courthouse but a dispute
resolution centre, where the grievant would first be channelled through a
screening clerk who would then direct him/her to the process, or sequence of
processes, most appropriate to his/her type of case.5
Within each court, each case would be individually assessed and referred to a specific
resolution process on the basis of its particular characteristics. Further, each “door” of the
“multi-door courthouse” would represent one of the dispute resolution options to which parties
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Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, 82 A.B.A. J. 54, 55 (1996) (quoting: Frank E.A.
Sander, Bussey Professor of Law at Harvard University, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (1976), in
70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976)).

may be referred, whether that be mediation, evaluation, arbitration, conciliation, or
adjudication.6
In some ways, the development of the multi-door model in the 1970s can be linked to the
confusion and uncertainty that disputants might experience if they wanted to access the newly
developing ADR processes outside the courts. For example, even in May 1997 Judge Earl
Johnson of the California Court of Appeals stated:
At present, it is almost accidental if community members find their way to an
appropriate forum other than the regular courts. Since these forums are operated by
a hodgepodge of local government agencies, neighborhood organizations and trade
associations, citizens must be very knowledgeable about community resources to
locate the right forum for their particular dispute.7
It is clear that the “multi-door” approach that emerged in the 1970s was inextricably linked to
the concept of the “multi-door courthouse” and the approach was based on the assumption that
the referral of disputes would take place with the court at the epicentre of the referral system.
This approach, with the court as the epicentre of dispute resolution, is no longer appropriate in
many jurisdictions particularly where the vast bulk of disputes are referred, resolved, and
settled away from the court system and often before litigation has commenced. The more
modern approach responds to the more evolved ADR system, the continuing rise in the use of
ADR, a more sophisticated understanding of ADR options, and the availability of referral
information on the internet and elsewhere. Rather than a “multi-door courthouse” a “multi
option” justice system now operates.
The multi-option systemic approach supports external ADR agencies and processes and
supports awareness levels about process availability. ADR standards, brochures, websites, and
government bodies all assist with this. In many countries, existing mandatory pre-litigation
approaches support clear pathways which enable and foster dispute resolution outside of the
court system. The multi-option approach also assumes that some dispute resolution processes
will continue to be used in respect of litigated matters and that some ADR will remain in the
court system. However, the multi-option approach supports ADR options to enable most
disputes to be resolved away from the civil court system which suggests that fewer civil
disputes may be dealt with by the court system.
The repositioning of the courts within the justice landscape also shifted as understandings
about justice and the role of adjudication in achieving justice changed. For example, one
commentator has distinguished between the “new ADR movement” (which he viewed as
emerging in the late 1970s in response to the United States 1976 Pound Conference on the
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Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice),8 and the “old ADR
Movement” that existed for centuries and promoted adjudicative processes. The Pound
Conference was said to have “made ADR fashionable and brought it to the fore of the
American adjudicatory scene.”9 In essence, adjudication by the late 1970s was increasingly
not seen as providing the only or the primary pathway to the attainment of justice. This
shift can also be considered in the context of a shift towards self-determination and away
from dependency. Arguably, the next stage in the shift could be described as the “new, new
ADR movement” which locates ADR more significantly away from the adjudication
system.
This article explores these changes in the context of current and past perspectives about the
justice system and considers how courts are currently positioned in the justice system in
view of the changing ADR landscape. In the discussion that follows, it is suggested that the
broader conceptualisation of justice (outside judicial adjudication) has its roots in traditional
formulations of justice concepts and that this conceptualization does not displace
the important, significant, and essential role played by the judiciary in the public
adjudication of civil disputes. The broader conceptualization does not inappropriately
confine justice within institutions; rather, it supports a different and more modern justice
system that includes both an ADR system and a court system. Such changes are not
problematic for courts (or the justice system) provided that the role of courts is not
diminished or supplanted by adjudicative forms of ADR such as arbitration and provided
that access to forms of judicial intervention is not inappropriately restrained.

What is justice? Representations and Philosophy
Some have suggested that justice is an “elusive concept upon which it is possible for
rational and informed observers to disagree,” even though it is “one of the core principles
of every national legal system”10 and that “access to justice” is nebulous and “survive[s] in
political and legal discourse because it is capable of meaning different things to different
people.”11 These differences have meant that there is continuing disagreement amongst
those who locate justice only in the court system and those who consider justice exists
throughout the dispute resolution landscape.
The differences can be partly attributed to different philosophical understandings. Put
simply, more traditional and perhaps somewhat romantic litigation supporters may consider
8
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that justice can only take place within courts as it is only through the articulation by a judge
of understandings about the rule of law that justice can be done. In contrast, those that
inhabit the ADR landscape may consider that while there is an important, significant and
essential role played by the judiciary in the public adjudication of civil disputes, justice is
also present in the relationships that exist between people and in their ethical values and
ADR supports this broader formulation of justice.
This vision of justice is consistent with the concept of justice as explored by philosophers
such as Socrates and Aristotle who identified justice as a virtue where its existence was
demonstrated by abidance with law and fairness. Questions relating to whether you could
have justice without law was explored by these early philosophers who considered that law
was the essential starting point for justice, although justice did not require impartial
adjudication. Rather, justice was demonstrated as a virtue according to Aristotle in respect
of relationships with others.12
The conceptualisation of justice by Aristotle involved at least two dimensions:
Particular justice on the other hand, . . . is divided into two kinds. One
kind is exercised in the distribution of honors, wealth, and other divisible
assets of the community, . . . the other kind is that which supplies a
corrective principle in private transactions.13
An essential component of justice was, therefore, to be found in the relationships that
existed between people and the notion that fairness or merit should be applied within a
social justice framework. In these early conceptualisations, there is recognition that a
corrective principle is applied; however, it can be applied as a result of the individual’s
ethical virtue rather than through the imposition of a rule by another. The ‘corrective
principle’ is the law that provides the foundation for the ethical virtue.14
The notion that justice is provided by an external figure (rather than residing as an ethical
virtue within an individual or resulting from agreements based on ethical values) appears to
have originally been formulated in Western societies following the initial creation and
representation of a female figure as a deity and the later representations of that deity. In an
engaging commentary by Resnik and Curtis exploring the representations of justice figures
and the architecture of courts,15 it is clear that this figure (much like the concept of justice)
12
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is understood differently by different theorists.16 In terms of the history of this
representation, Manning notes that, from a historical perspective, the “Egyptian term that
can be translated as ‘justice’ is Ma’at, which is also embodied as a female deity depicted
always with an ostrich feather in her hair.”17 In many of these representations, justice is
provided by a deity or god.
Considering representations of “justice” provides some insight into the definition of justice
over time. Representations of justice as a female figure grew over the past three centuries to
the point that, in many Western countries, the figure is seen to represent both justice and
law. This representation is relatively recent (although it originally stemmed from somewhat
ancient roots). Interestingly, prior to this time and from the fourteenth century until the
nineteenth century it seems that the depiction of justice was more likely to be linked to the
notion of “heavenly justice” with artwork more commonly featuring biblical scenes such as
the Last Supper18 appearing in some early courts and justice being linked closely to
religion. The relinking of justice to a female figure became more common over the past
three centuries as “Justice imagery became entwined with the Catholic Church which,
unlike Jewish and Islamic traditions, regularly deploys personifications. Female figures
identified as Justice can be found in Christian art from as early as the fifth century.”19
These images of justice represented a departure from the earlier philosophical formulation
of justice and symbolize differing philosophical interpretations and understandings of
justice. Justice in this departure was something that was achieved by the actions of an
independent, even-handed figure who “judged” rather than justice that was the result of
individual ethics and interrelated values in relation to reciprocity and social and other
relationships expressed as the rule of law. However, as Resnik and Curtis note, the female
figure of justice was originally more likely to be a reflection of a virtue (other virtues being
Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance), which is consistent with the notion that justice does
not require judgment by another. For this perspective, the female justice figure can
represent the attributes of justice that include even-handedness and rationality (the scales),
fairness (the blindfold) and courage (the sword). 20
According to Resnik and Curtis, discomfort with the portrayal of justice as either a deified
image or the linking of justice to “judging” is one reason why courts are increasingly using
more abstract depictions of justice.21 In these depictions, modern justice is more likely to be
16
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portrayed as a set of ethical values and as a virtue (not as a goddess or deity). This approach
is consistent with the earlier philosophical underpinnings of the concept, as well as more
recent discussions about the role of judges within the justice system and even the breadth of
the justice system.
From this “new” (but old!) justice perspective, justice starts with the individual and is
supported by the State and the rule of law. Whilst judging by an independent “judge” is a
critical feature in the context of the articulation of the rule of law, it is not the centrepiece
of the system. The rearticulation and the approach adopted by those in the access to justice
field (discussed below) locate both ADR and judicial determination within the justice
system particularly where ADR supports the identification of and the attributes of justice.
Justice in this context can therefore be described as incorporating a “characteristic set of
principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining what [is] the proper
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”22

What is the New Justice System? Access to Justice
As noted previously, the new or modern justice system does not locate courts at the
epicenter of the justice system. Rather courts are a critical component of the system. The
concept of justice has been expanded partly because of an exploration of access to justice
notions that gathered momentum in the latter half of the 20th century. Certainly, some
would credit the access to justice movement with the redefinition of the concept of justice
or at least triggering the reconceptualization of the concept. In exploring access issues, it is
recognized that adopting a more narrow view of justice assumes that it is done unto others
rather than recognizing that justice can also be demonstrated and achieved through noncourt based processes.
In “Justice in Many Rooms,”23 Galanter argues that the access to justice movement
historically adopted a view of justice that he terms “legal centralism.” The movement was
“an effort to enhance the flow of disputes into appropriate official forums where they would
find justice.”24 Galanter suggests that legal centralism portrays a “picture in which the state
agencies (and their learning) occupy the centre of legal life and stand in a relation of
‘hierarchic control’ to other, less normative orderings such as the family, the corporation,
the business network.”25
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JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ., 2005) (1971). Rawls conceives
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In locating justice outside official forums, attention can be paid to what Galanter terms
“‘indigenous law” – that is, mechanisms for private ordering whereby communities and
actors outside the state create their own sets of social norms, standards, and processes in
order to regulate their own activities. This more pluralistic view supports a vision of justice
where ethical values are supported by institutions, the rule of law as well as processes that
support self-determination and participation. In this vision of justice, justice is not only
about the rule of law (or the rule “by” law); justice also aspires to support members of the
society and is linked to notions of deliberative democracy26 as well as the reality that many
civilised individuals will not require a judicial adjudication and have obligations to be civil
with one another.
The trend of access to justice commentators and reformers has occurred internationally. In
Australia for example, Sackville suggested that the Australian “access to justice” movement
that began in the 1960s and continued into the 1970s was based on a number of
assumptions about the justice system that have proved incomplete or inaccurate with the
passage of time.27 He considered that these assumptions led to an inflated sense of what the
courts can achieve and this consideration prompted a greater discussion about the adequate
fulfilment of justice ideals. Sackville noted, in earlier work, that the Australian Access to
Justice Advisory Committee explored access to justice as not only the capacity to equally
access “legal services and effective dispute resolution mechanisms,” but also as
encompassing “national equity (that is, access to legal services regardless of place of
residence)” and “equality before the law (that is, the removal of barriers creating or
exacerbating dependency and disempowerment).”28
In the United Kingdom, Lord Woolf also considered the notion of access to justice more
broadly as “referring to the principles that must be adopted by the civil justice system in
order to achieve objectives within that system,”29 which necessarily led to an expanded
concept of justice.
A number of theorists over the past fifty years have explored the justice concept by
reference to the access to justice movement and the emerging recognition that litigation
reforms would not address inherent justice system deficiencies. According to Cappelletti,
the first wave of the access to justice movement was aimed at addressing the economic
barriers to accessing courts and litigation and in particular in supporting and enhancing
26
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legal aid.30 The second wave of the movement focused on addressing the “organisation
obstacle” to accessing justice.31 This approach focused less on values or rights and
recognised that individuals belong to a broader society, and as such require processes for
addressing challenges that affect collective rights, relationships, and well-being, as opposed
to those of the individual. This wave focused on developing strategies for protecting
collective interests and included devices such as the class action.32
The so-called third wave of the access to justice movement was concerned with procedural
obstacles to securing justice. It recognised that “in certain areas or kinds of controversies,
the normal solution – the traditional contentious litigation in court – might not be the best
possible way to provide effective vindication of rights.”33
Cappelletti suggests that:
What must first be said is that, whereas – in the last two centuries or so –
Western civilizations have glorified the ideal of fighting for one’s rights
… we should recognise that in certain areas a different approach – one
that I used to call ‘co-existential justice’ – might be preferable and better
able to assure access to justice. We should be humble enough to
recognise that we might have a lot to learn from African and Asian
traditions.34
Sackville explored the impact of the access to justice movement from a different
perspective, although his conclusions were somewhat similar. Sackville also considered that
the access to justice movement was based on a number of flawed or incomplete assumptions
about the court system. The first assumption was that the court system is capable
of upholding the rights of disadvantaged people in a timely and cost-effective manner.
Sackville suggested that, although courts will continue to play an integral role in
supporting the disadvantaged, this form of dispute finalisation will always be inherently
time-consuming. According to Sackville, the other assumptions of the access to justice
movement were that legal aid funding would continue to support accessibility and that much
of the access to justice rhetoric was focused on creating a rights-based system with an
expanding court system. Legal aid courts, however, have not expanded over time, and there
is also an increasing recognition that justice can be administered and supported outside the
State-based court system.
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31

Id. at 284.

32

Id. at 285.

33

Id. at 287.

34

Id. at 282.

Sackville noted that “it would seem that the time has come to recognise that many of the
most promising pathways to justice be outside the court and tribunal system. In particular,
they are to be found in the work of community legal centres, especially through programs
designed to empower people to make ‘effective choices about legal issues’.”35 In 2002, he
concluded that “[p]erhaps access to justice has got much less to do with lawyers and courts
than most of us have realised.”36 In other words, the third wave of the access to justice
movement no longer located the formal legal system as the sole domain of justice.
By 2006, this view of justice had been adopted by policy makers and the judiciary within
Australia. In his opening address to the National Access to Justice and Pro Bono
Conference in 2006, the former Chief Justice of Australia, the Hon. Murray Gleeson AO
said:
Access to justice has a much wider meaning than access to litigation.
Even the incomplete form of justice that is measured in terms of legal
rights and obligations is not delivered solely, or even mainly, through
courts or other dispute resolution processes. To think of justice
exclusively in an adversarial legal context would be a serious error.37

ADR and the Delivery of Justice
The increasing use of ADR in some jurisdictions, and in particular mandatory pre-filing
ADR, reignited the debate about the parameters and meaning of justice. In Australia, where
ADR is integrated within the court system and where mandatory referral to ADR can also
take place before proceedings are commenced, this discussion about the meaning of justice
has been limited and has tended to focus more on how ADR can deliver and support justice.
In contrast, in the United Kingdom and the United States, a small number of theorists have
continued to suggest that ADR can never ‘really’ deliver justice.
One issue in the debate about this conceptualisation of justice is whether or not court based
adjudicated outcomes are perhaps better placed to deliver justice than forms of ADR. Hazel
Genn, for example, asks if ADR processes can ever deliver justice because outcomes are
not tested and the quality of a settlement is questionable. According to Genn:
Access to justice is an essential element in the rule of law. Despite the
private nature of ADR, it is argued that diverting legal disputes away
from the courts and into mediation is, in fact, a strategy that will
increase access to justice. But this is a claim that requires some scrutiny.
Mediation does not contribute to access to the courts because it is
35
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specifically non-court-based. It does not contribute to substantive justice
because mediation requires the parties to relinquish ideas of legal rights
during mediation and focus, instead, on problem-solving. Mediators are
not concerned about substantive justice because the mediator’s role is to
assist the parties in reaching a settlement of their dispute. The mediator
does not make a judgement about the quality of the settlement. Success
in mediation is defined in the mediation literature and by mediators
themselves as a settlement that parties “can live with.” The outcome of
mediation, therefore, is not about just settlement it is just about
settlement.38 (emphasis added).
This analysis is based on the assumption that mediation does not require participants to
focus on rights. In my view, this assumption is simply not correct. In many mediations, the
legal framework and the understanding of the legal rights of parties will be a critical issue
in determining whether or not parties negotiate and how. The legal framework will often
define the parameters of the problem or an important dimension of the conflict, although it
is the parties, and not the mediator, who will define, discuss and explore the rights – more
often than not the mediator role is linked to supporting this discussion. In other mediations,
there may be little focus on legal rights particularly if the problem is not defined in terms of
legal rights and it may never be capable of being defined in those terms.
The focus may also not be on settlement in mediation. In many mediations, the focus is on
“good” or “wise” decision-making that requires a consideration of outcomes that could be
achieved in rights-based systems and can naturally include the decision not to settle and to
litigate or do something else.39 The acceptance of ADR and ADR outcomes does not import
a rejection of the rule of law. Rather, these approaches involve a different pathway to reach
an outcome that is “just” as defined by the parties in the context of their relationship and
the rule of law.
Some of the concerns about the capacity of ADR to provide justice have their origin in
work that first appeared in 1984.40 At that time, Fiss who was troubled by the increasing
focus on ADR in the court system, stated that:
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to
judgment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and
indiscriminate basis. It should be treated instead as a highly problematic
technique for streamlining dockets. Settlement is for me the civil
analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often coerced; the bargain may
be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial and
38
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judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and
although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done. Like plea
bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society
and should be neither encouraged nor praised.41
Fiss assumed that justice could only be achieved through judicial determination as forms of
ADR may either render the parties unequal42 or exacerbate inequities as “[j]udgment aspires
to an autonomy from distributional inequalities, and it gathers much of its appeal
from this aspiration.”43 A second concern related to “authority” and the capacity of
individuals to enter into agreements is that such agreements may be contrary to other
interests such as weaker third parties (for example, children) or interests of parties who are
not included in the negotiation (such as environmental or other interests).44 A third concern
is linked to whether there is compliance with outcomes reached as a result of settlement and
to what extent there is a capacity to review arrangements.45 A final objection related to
ensuring that public adjudication is retained in view of its importance in relation to
supporting society46 and “... to explicate and give force to the values embodied in
authoritative texts such as the Constitution [and] statutes: to interpret those values and to
brin[g] reality into accord with them.”47
The views of Fiss and Genn are predicated on the assumptions that justice achieved by
judicial determination is superior to that which can be achieved by agreement between
people and that ADR is displacing court-based adjudication or limiting access to
adjudication. Each of these assumptions requires close consideration, however, it is
suggested that neither assumption is correct.
With regards to the first assumption that judicial determination is superior to ADR in
delivering substantive justice, significant work that has been undertaken in defining and
outlining the impact of procedural justice (as well as other forms of justice) suggests that
justice does not only involve outcomes that are in compliance with a rule of law. Other
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factors are relevant that can be linked to ‘voice’, participation and procedural explanation.
In addition, there is adjudicated court hearings may not produce substantive justice. As
Burnside noted, “At the start of a career as a law student, we see Law and Justice as
synonymous; later we fall into cynicism or despair as clients complain that Law and Justice
seem unrelated …”48 Davies has observed that:
... it still seems to be generally accepted that our system is effective at
achieving justice between the parties. I think that … is a
misapprehension. Between parties of equal bargaining power that might
be so but that is rarely, if ever, the case. And between parties of unequal
bargaining power our system is unfair… the richer litigant can afford the
better lawyer. He or she can also afford to pay for more time to be spent
on the preparation of her or his case. And the richer litigant may compel
a poorer opponent to expend more money than he or she can afford by
engaging in time and cost-wasting procedures thereby compelling the
poorer litigant either to compromise unfairly or give up. Nowhere is this
unfairness more evident than in litigation in which one part is
unrepresented, a situation which is becoming increasingly common. So
to invest our system with the virtues of ascertaining the truth or of
achieving fairness between the parties does not stand up to close
examination. In truth it achieves neither.49

Importantly, in the context of the role that ADR has in delivering justice, Cappelletti
suggests “there are situations in which conciliatory (or ‘co-existential’) justice is able to
produce results which, far from being ‘second class,’ are better, even qualitatively, than the
results of contentious litigation.”50 He observed that situations in which the parties are
concerned with preserving ongoing relationships are a prime example of disputes suitable
for conciliatory or “mending” justice.51 Cappelletti argued that the desirability of preserving
relations through ADR can be seen in disputes between people who are likely to have
ongoing exposure to one another – for example, neighbours, those in schools and
universities, patients in hospitals, and those who have business or workplace
relationships.52 As those in the access to justice movement have noted, the outcome of court
adjudication can clearly be influenced by many factors, including the quality of
representation, the resources available to the litigant and the quality of the decision-making

48

Julian Burnside, The Practice of Law: Justice or Just a Job? 8 NEWCASTLE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).

49

Geoffrey L Davies, Paper delivered at the 20 th Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Annual
Conference: The Reality of Civil Justice Reform: Why We Must Abandon the Essential Elements of Our
System (July 12, 2002) 4-5 (transcript available at http://www.aija.org.au/ac02/Davies.pdf).
50

Cappelletti, supra note 30, at 289.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 290.

and surrounding rights-based framework. In addition, adjudicative decision-making can be
influenced by a range of factors that can influence substantive justice.53
The view that outcomes achieved in the various parts of the system may have strengths and
weaknesses and that “perfect justice” is aspirational is probably a more realistic one. Just as
outcomes in a court adjudication may be “better” in some instances than ADR outcomes, so
too an ADR outcome may be “better” than court outcomes in other circumstances. If
engagement in ADR, for example, supports (and possibly extends) relationships and
individual and community empowerment, and betters future decision-making, then arguably
this outcome is as important as the normative and influential impact a court judgment
might have. In this context, there is a great deal of general literature that refers to
the behaviour of individuals in dispute. Some of this relates to concepts of “learned
helplessness”54 and the need to have justice option mechanisms in place that support the
attainment of helpful negotiation and conflict resolution skills as well as continuing
relationships.
In terms of the second assumption made by Genn and Fiss – that ADR is displacing judicial
adjudication – there are a number of points that can be made. For example, ADR may
simply remove some disputes from the queue that forms as people wait to litigate. If they
do not reach agreement, they can rejoin the queue. Access to justice and the courts is
enhanced through the use of ADR as those disputes that require judicial determination are
able to access it. Judicial adjudication is not displaced, rather it is supported. Clearly, an
overburdened court system has implications for both society and justice. Disputants may not
take action if they think that they cannot do so – the justice mechanism may be “too hard”
to access, individuals may not be aware that they have a “right” to take action, or
they may be unable to access court-based services because it is too slow, particularly if they
have a disability or some other limitation. The wider view of justice that incorporates ADR
as well as judicial determination does not suggest that ADR should limit access. Rather, in
terms of the more recent configurations of justice, the system should stress personal
obligations to resolve disputes before enabling access to judicial adjudication except where
this is not appropriate because of disadvantage or some other factor such as urgency.
However it may be that some forms of ADR can displace court adjudication more readily
than others. As ADR can be facilitative, advisory, or determinative (and sometimes a mix
53
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of processes) it may be that more advisory and determinative processes have different
impacts and may displace court adjudication in a more significant way. For example, the
impact of facilitative forms of ADR such as mediation may be more limited than the impact
of determinative forms of ADR such as arbitration as forms of arbitration can effectively
oust the jurisdiction of domestic courts and replace the public court focused adjudicative
process with private, and sometimes corporate, rather than State (and citizen controlled55)
adjudication initiatives (see discussion below).

The Role of Courts and Judges
The demise of the multi-door courthouse model and the rise of the multi-option approach
which is predicated on the notion that the justice system exists beyond courts and that
courts have a limited role in the context of justice provision has significant implications for
the future role of courts and judges. In particular, the question that must be explored is
whether courts should focus primarily or perhaps even solely on adjudication and leave
ADR to those who operate outside courts.56 The multi-option approach, however, does not
suggest limiting the role of courts in this manner. Rather, it continues to locate some ADR
processes within the court environment which enables considerable benefits to be
realised.58 Those benefits include elevating ADR processes to a socially and judicially
acceptable level, and ensuring that “market imperfections” do not adversely impact ADR
processes.59
Clearly, there are a number of issues that arise where ADR processes are situated or mainly
connected to the court system (as was envisaged in the early multi-door arrangements). For
example, locating ADR within courts and not supporting ADR in the pre-litigation area may
mean that people may be less likely to use ADR before commencing litigation. This reality
means that courts need to be wary of how much ADR they may offer (even on a
referral basis) and be aware of trends in dispute resolution outside courts. Offering and
regulating ADR within court environments may also reduce the number and scope of prelitigation ADR options available (particularly if having different levels of immunity for
ADR practitioners may make ADR more attractive for practitioners - higher levels of
immunity within court referral frameworks and lower levels outside courts could provide
disincentives to pre-litigation ADR).
Other critical issues with a multi-door model include concerns about the institutionalisation
of ADR processes and a potential loss of flexibility in terms of process design. Court
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structures and processes may impact ADR processes, so ADR may begin to “model”
institutionalised processes and norms. Other concerns relate to the “grass roots” nature of
ADR processes and the potential “legalisation”60 of ADR as more evaluative forms of ADR
are sponsored, or perhaps preferred, by those within courts and tribunals.
Institutionalisation within a legal framework will almost inevitably produce greater
uniformity, regulation, and codification of ADR and this may have some benefits. As
Sharon Press has pointed out, however, this can inhibit process flexibility.61 There may also
be funding and other issues where declining court budgets are present - the ADR budget (if
it exists) may be seen as the easiest area to cut as there is an understandable preference to
ensure that the adjudication area remains resourced. There are other issues as well that can
be linked to temperament and training. For example, should judges mediate or should the
judicial role be limited to some forms of facilitative ADR such as settlement conferences
where caucusing does not take place?
At the same time, the multi-option approach is not without difficulties. One issue that arises
in the emergence of the multi-option system of justice where most ADR activity takes place
away from courts is that there may be less capacity to regulate ADR other than through
systems of reporting, standards, and accreditation. In this regard, it has been argued that
quality control mechanisms can be introduced more readily within a court than where ADR
operates outside of any structure or framework.62 There is limited evidence, however, that
this has been the case within court systems where ADR has been a focus. In such systems,
ordinarily there has been limited quality control and evaluation of processes.
In addition, the rise of the multi-option model of justice raises pragmatic issues relating to
funding. For example, should traditional adjudication absorb most of the available funding
in a justice budget? Will different processes “compete” for funding or will policy decisions
assume that much ADR will be privately-funded?63 At present, the multi-option model that
is supported in jurisdictions such as Australia by a raft of legislative devices (that may
require ADR prior to entry into the court or tribunal system) assumes that there will be
some funded ADR agencies (for example, the Federal Attorney-General funds many family
ADR agencies and family relationship centres64) whilst others will be self-funded and
supported by persuasive structures and processes (such as benchmarks, standards,
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contractual requirements, and codes). ADR is also utilised and supported outside of the
litigation system by split or partial funding arrangements. For example, many schemes that
operate at the community level and are directed at family65 and community disputes are
partly funded by the government, while others directed at commercial and general civil
disputes are industry funded or privately funded.
The multi-option approach that uses a mixed funding model assumes that guidance is not
required by courts to enable those within our society to access the broad range of ADR
processes and that there is no need, in most instances, to locate a coordinating function
inside the court system. The approach assumes that referral networks will operate to
support disadvantaged disputants and that otherwise a “Do it Yourself” approach supported
by internet, telephone, or online systems will divert most civil disputes away from courts.
At the heart of the approach are dispute resolution schemes that can operate at local, state,
and federal levels in businesses, government, and other organisations. For example, in many
jurisdictions, dispute resolution schemes have been set up in various industries to provide
a free, effective, and relatively quick means of resolving disputes about products and
services. This approach assumes that ADR processes do not belong to any particular
organisation or professional body but rather that they are available at all levels of society.
If this approach – which situates ADR across the society – is adopted, then one primary
issue will be the provision of information and whether it is necessary for a coordinating
body to provide information. This again raises issues about how collaboration and
coordination can be most effectively fostered within the justice system and whether courts
should be doing more to understand what lies outside their doors.66

The Relationship Between Courts and ADR
The relationship between ADR and courts remains uneasy in many jurisdictions and this is
problematic from a systemic perspective. Courts are often unaware of dispute resolution
options outside courts and of the innovation that exists in the ADR area. For example,
innovations in online dispute resolution may not be understood, appreciated or adopted by
courts. To use a medical analogy, it is as if surgeons in a hospital were unaware of what
pharmaceutical approaches and other less traditional approaches were being used on
patients (that could perhaps be usefully incorporated within a hospital setting). This is of
course not the case with all courts. Some courts have more sophisticated understandings
than others about ADR and have led ADR reform initiatives. Whilst most courts are aware
of ADR, however, few courts are engaged in any active dialogue with the non-legal parts of
the ADR sector.
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Increasingly, ADR and the courts have been perceived as engaged in an interdependent
partnership.67 This relationship requires courts to continue to articulate and enforce the
substantive law and to set appropriate legal parameters for ADR, for example in relation to
the finality of private dispute resolution, and the confidentiality and admissibility of
mediation communications.68 There are however significant variations in terms of court
approaches and understandings about these important matters and there may also be
significantly different ethical rules that apply to those involved in court connected ADR
and non court connected programs. These difference can mean that consumers of ADR in
one part of the system (for example where ADR is linked to the court) may have more
incentives to use ADR than where it is not linked In addition, there are varying approaches
to issues relating to the quality of ADR processes that are connected to courts in some way.
On the whole, there seems to be a disinclination for courts to evaluate or foster research
into ADR even where referral is more or less mandatory and connected to a court as few
courts are concerned with or prepared to take responsibility for the quality of court
connected ADR processes other than providing minimal monitoring (and at times not even
performing this function).
There are also significant variations and a lack of consistency about how ADR is connected
to courts. For example, in some courts, ADR is provided by court staff and has an important
role to play within the court itself: increasing litigant satisfaction; promoting a
more positive cooperative culture within courts; and helping courts deal with their caseloads.
In other courts, the integration between ADR and a court may invite a
consideration of the judicial function and role. For example, in some courts judges may use
facilitative processes when encouraging settlement69 – these may vary from a discussion of
the “issues” and a suggestion that settlement be attempted to judges providing a preliminary
view (an evaluation) on issues that have been raised and the evidence that may be
required.70 Other judges may use facilitative processes and techniques of summary and
reframing when conducting concurrent evidence (“hot tub”) processes71 or when involved in
specialist “problem solving” courts. The restorative, comprehensive, therapeutic justice
models all involve a greater focus on procedural justice and some techniques and approaches
that are now used by judges can be identified as arising and first gaining prominence
in the ADR sector. More rarely, judges may follow a more proscribed
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mediation process model. 72
The differing relationship between courts, policy-makers, and ADR and the variations in
the philosophical approaches to ADR varies greatly and produces a range of integration
strategies (that may appear in combination in some Courts):
1.  
Pre-litigation ADR – either supervised or unsupervised by courts and falling
within the ‘shadow of the court’ and often involving mandatory strategies.
2.  
Self-referred litigation related ADR – where courts and tribunals are not involved
and may be unaware that parties are using external ADR processes.
3.  
Court-connected ADR – involving referral to ADR processes – such processes
might be conducted by external or internal practitioners.
4.  
Court-integrated ADR – involving judicial and quasi-judicial officers within
Courts using ADR processes to resolve and manage disputes (processes may vary
from settlement conferences, mediation, or concurrent evidence approaches)
– this integration may involve facilitative judging.
These variations and the lack of consistency across the system in the tracking and evaluation
of ADR use means that the modern justice system is not well understood and it is
difficult for sound policy decisions to be made, particularly as there is little research that
tracks disputes from the point that they arise to the point of finalisation. There is also little
information about how ADR changes have impacted courts and the court system. Whilst a
number of commentators have suggested that the “vanishing trial” has become a feature of
some jurisdictions, it may be that the work done by courts has become harder and more
complex. While some complexity can be linked to statutory and relationship complexity (as
often more people and organisations are involved in social and commercial transactions and
disputes than in the past) some of the complexity can be linked to the types of disputes that
are finalized by ADR.
For example, the role of the courts is arguably changing as they deal with more intractable
and violent disputes that defy resolution by ADR. Within Australia, the revised family law
arrangements require people to use dispute resolution before commencing court
proceedings, a Commonwealth taskforce noted that the processes used to resolve, settle, or
determine disputes in that area had changed in recent years. 73 The report noted that:
Government intervention in a non-violent family dispute focuses initially
on improved access to information, to filter some disputes and assist all,
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then mandate the use of informal mechanisms to reserve the most
entrenched disputes (and those involving violence) for the courts.74
This changing role, where courts deal with the most difficult disputes, may skew both the
workload of the courts and the understanding that courts have about the dispute resolution
landscape. From a court perspective, disputes and disputants may appear to be increasingly
motivated by irrationality and complexity. For disputant behaviour to be understood and
appreciated, better quality research about behaviours and motivations needs to take place.
In addition, the demographic profile of those who do use the courts needs to be better
understood so that more informed decisions can be made about triage, case management,
and court workloads.
At present, courts can also have a somewhat difficult relationship with ADR as they can
manage and support ADR processes by their interpretation of ADR clauses in contracts and
in legislation that seeks to promote or mandate ADR. Where understandings of the dispute
resolution perspective are gleaned only from an “in court” experience, rather than a whole
of justice system perspective, decisions about these important matters are more likely to
reflect the concerns of a small number of disputants and lawyers who may have limited
understandings about the world of dispute resolution that exists away from their doors.
There are other issues that are linked to this relationship between ADR and the courts that
require examination and have been previously raised. Genn’s concerns that ADR might
displace the court system are relevant in this regard. Whilst the concerns may not be as
relevant with respect to facilitative processes such as mediation in the civil setting, there
have been issues with ADR processes that are determinative, particularly where they exist
outside of courts and can “trump” domestic court determinations.
In the arbitration area, for example, the Philip Morris Asia Arbitration that was pursued
against the Government of Australia regarding tobacco plain packaging legislation followed
Australian court cases that found that the legislation was valid. 75 The arbitration is being
conducted pursuant to a 1993 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the
Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Hong Kong
Agreement) that effectively ousts the domestic courts76 and provides that arbitration can be
conducted to challenge the capacity of a State to deal with some domestic law as an arbitral
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decision may be made that overturns both legislative intention and judicial ruling.77 The
ousting or limiting of the courts’ jurisdiction as a result of specific arbitral agreement (or as
in the Philip Morris case via more generalised investor state arrangements) raises issues for
both States and courts about the boundaries of ADR and where limits should be placed
regarding determinative ADR processes that exist outside domestic courts.

Conclusion
The modern civil justice system involves a repositioning of courts and an acknowledgement
and understanding of the breadth of the justice system. As justice is increasingly perceived
as a much broader concept, and the system involves a number of non-static elements, the
litigation system and judicial dispute adjudication will be viewed as a far smaller, although
critical, dimension of a broader justice system. The important and expanded role of the
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) environment requires recognition and a clear
acknowledgment that ADR should not supplant judicial determination or the courts; rather,
judicial determination must remain a useful and essential part of the civil justice system.
To support the new justice system, all components of the system must be considered and
supported using a systemic approach. The reality is that the relationship between the parts
of the system that focus on dispute resolution are symbiotic – each is reliant on the other
and each is required to support a just society. Institutionalized justice is supported by
informal justice, and informal justice requires institutions and impartial judicial
determination. The integration of ADR at all levels of the justice system has significant
implications for courts. Their processes will continue to evolve as there is recognition that
some ADR skills can be blended with judicial adjudication approaches while still
maintaining core judicial values (transparency, accountability, and maintenance of the rule
of law). Some ongoing issues include the extent to which determinative processes can oust
judicial determination, whether judges should adopt ADR processes and conduct
mediations with private sessions (behind closed doors) or whether settlement conferencing
without caucus is more appropriate78 and how ethical rules and requirements in respect of
confidentiality, impartiality and immunity will apply.
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The definition of “justice,” its objectives, and the reach of the justice system, as well as the
location of dispute settlement options, has significant political, policy, social, and funding
implications. In this context, the framing of the civil justice system as inimical to the
litigation and court system is no longer (if it ever was) part of the policy approach of many
governments. In view of this change, the role of the courts and judicial determination
requires reexamination. It seems that courts and judges will do less civil dispute work.
However the work that they do is likely to be more complex and involve more intractable
disputes. At the same time the way that courts and judges ‘do’ their work will continue to
change. Judges will become more responsive and more flexible partly because the
community and the broader ADR environment support these changes. However, if the
recent past is any indicator, it seems likely that judges will lead much of this innovation.
For such innovations to be productive and to ensure the long term health of the court
system it is critical that a closer understanding and relationship between courts and the
ADR system be developed and supported. This will enable innovations in each area to be
extended and ensure that disputants experience a supportive justice experience.
In addition, to ensure that the system maintains its integrity it must be based on transparent
objectives and ethical criteria. Using such a construct suggests that more facilitative forms
of ADR such as mediation can operate and support the resolution of most civil disputes.
Arbitration, however, may require additional boundaries or clear limitations to ensure that
core values inherent in the system can be met (for example, by ensuring that important
health and safety issues cannot be diverted to private forms of arbitration that restrict
citizen participation and rights and oust the operation of the court system). This approach
may also ensure that there is no displacing of the important maintenance and articulation of
justice values and rights undertaken by courts and may assist to more clearly locate and
support ADR options across the system.
In determining the boundaries of the system and articulating the ethical values at the core of
the system that is founded on rights, principles, and characteristics of “justice” – freedom,
equality and fairness (from a humanistic and egalitarian perspective) -- and returning to a
core value approach might assist to ensure that justice objectives are met and may also
support the work of courts and the ADR system into the future. An ethical value approach
might also assist to delineate between different process choices and articulate subobjectives for the judicial adjudication, facilitative, advisory, and determinative forms of
ADR which can in turn provide more guidance for disputants, practitioners, courts, judges,
and governments and potentially assist to evaluate the effectiveness of processes and the
extent to which they meet objectives.79
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